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We argue that the Great Inflation experienced by both the United Kingdom and the 
United States in the 1970s has an explanation valid for both countries.  The explanation 
does not appeal to common shocks or to exchange rate linkages, but to the common 
doctrine underlying the systematic monetary policy choices in each country.  The 
nonmonetary approach to inflation control that was already influential in the United 
Kingdom came to be adopted by the United States during the 1970s.  We document our 
position by examining official policymaking doctrine in the United Kingdom and the 
United States in the 1970s, and by considering results from a structural macroeconomic 
model estimated using U.K. data. 
 
Key Words: Great Inflation, doctrine, world inflation, nonmonetary theories of inflation. 
JEL Classification Numbers: E31; E52; E58. 
 
 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the NBER Great Inflation Conference, 
Woodstock, Vermont, September 25−27, 2008.  We thank Frank Smets and Rafael 
Wouters for providing the estimation code for Smets and Wouters (2007).  We are 
grateful to Michael Bordo and Athanasios Orphanides (the conference organizers and 
volume editors), Matthew Shapiro (our discussant), and conference and pre-conference 
attendees, for comments on the previous versions of this paper.  We are also indebted to 
Leon Berkelmans, Christopher Erceg, Jesper Lindé, Andrew Levin, Christopher Neely, 
Ricardo Nunes, Christina Romer, David Wheelock, seminar participants at the Federal 
Reserve Board, and an anonymous referee for many useful suggestions.  Charles Gascon, 
Luke Shimek, and Faith Weller provided research assistance.  The views expressed in 
this paper are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors.   1
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we study the Great Inflation in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  Our concentration on more than one country reflects our view that a sound 
explanation should account for the experience of the Great Inflation both in the United 
States and beyond.  We emphasize further that an explanation for the Great Inflation 
should be consistent with both the data and what we know about the views that guided 
policymakers. 
 
Figure 1 plots four-quarter inflation for the United Kingdom using the Retail Price Index, 
and four-quarter U.S. inflation using the Consumer Price Index.  The peaks in inflation in 
the mid-1970s and 1980 are over 20% in the United Kingdom, far higher than the 
corresponding U.S. peaks.  On the other hand, the ups and downs do resemble those in 
the United States; if we plotted the U.K. series alone and removed the numbering from 
the vertical axis, the figure might easily be mistaken at first glance for a depiction of U.S. 
inflation.  This suggests that U.S. and U.K. inflation share a basic common explanation.  
But, for reasons discussed below, the most standard rationalizations for the coincidence 
of inflation across economies—those that emphasize trading and exchange rate 
linkages—are not very appealing when it comes to explaining the similarities in the U.S. 
and U.K. inflation experiences.  Instead of appealing to common shocks or to exchange 
rate regime, we explain the similarity of U.S. and U.K. inflation by appealing to the 
common doctrines underlying policy decisions.  In particular, the flawed approach to 
inflation analysis, which dominated U.K. policymaking for several postwar decades, 
became very influential in the United States in the 1970s. 
 
In the course of our paper, we establish the following about the Great Inflation of the 
Seventies: 
 
(1) Nonmonetary approaches to inflation analysis and control dominated pre-1979 
policymaking in the United Kingdom. 
 
(2) U.S. policymakers adopted this framework from the early 1970s, and so believed that 
inflation was a nonmonetary phenomenon, in a sense made precise below.  This implied a 
belief that cost-push forces could produce inflation in the long run, even without 
monetary accommodation. 
   2
Figure 1. U.K. and U.S. four-quarter inflation rates 
 
 
(3) The nonmonetary view of inflation was held consistently by Federal Reserve 
Chairman Arthur Burns from late 1970 until his departure in 1978, and adhered to by 
other senior policymakers during Burns’ tenure and in 1978−79. 
  
(4) As a corollary, 1970s inflation outcomes did not reflect policymakers’ use of a 
Phillips curve model (with or without the “vertical in the long run” property). 
 
We use “Great Inflation of the Seventies” rather than “Great Inflation” deliberately 
because our account stresses the influence of U.K. ideas on 1970−79 U.S. policymaking, 
and not on U.S. policy in both the 1960s and 1970s.  For the United States, we do not 
find it useful to categorize the 1960s as part of the same inflation epoch as that of the 
1970s.  To do so is to gloss over the very significant segment of U.S. policymaking in 
1969−70 in which both policy decisions and the principles guiding them were largely 
modern and appropriate (i.e.: natural rate/long-run-vertical Phillips curve ideas had been 
rapidly incorporated into policy thinking; and the monetary authorities deliberately made 
real interest rates positive in order to move from an excess aggregate demand position, to 
a zero or temporarily negative output gap, so as to remove inflationary pressure).  The 
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fact that, instead of continuing the 1969−70 framework, U.S. policy thinking “went 
British,” with cost-push ideas becoming dominant at the most senior policy levels from 
late 1970.  As Milton Friedman (1979a) observed, “Ever since the founding of the 
colonies in the New World, Britain has been a major source of our economic and political 
thought.”  The Great Inflation period is another example of this influence, as the 
predominant U.S. policy thinking during the 1970s was patterned on a U.K. precedent. 
 
In Section 2 we discuss why we emphasize doctrine in studying the Great Inflation.  Then 
in Sections 3 and 4 we document the common themes in U.K. and U.S. policymaking.  
We go on to illustrate in Section 5 some of our points about U.K. policymaking doctrine 
in the 1970s through an examination of the monetary policy shock realizations implied by 
a version of the Smets and Wouters (2007) model estimated on U.K. data.  We also 
critically consider more benign interpretations of U.K. monetary policy decisions during 
the 1970s.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Why we emphasize doctrine 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, the discussions of the Great Inflation in such 1990s 
contributions as Taylor (1992), McCallum (1995), and DeLong (1997) can be seen as a 
backlash against the mechanical application of an “as-if” approach to analyzing past 
policy episodes.  A common practice in studying U.S. inflation data had been to take for 
granted that policymakers knew the correct model of private economic behavior (i.e., the 
specification of IS and Phillips curves).  Likewise, the “as-if” approach viewed data 
outcomes as the result of policymakers’ optimization of their objective function, 
conditional on their correct specification of private behavior (which appeared as 
constraints in the policymaker optimization problem).  Applications to the Great Inflation 
of the time-consistency or conservative-central-banker hypotheses can be thought of as 
quintessential examples of the “as-if” approach.  These stories attribute to policymakers 
knowledge of the economy’s structure, and characterizes high inflation as a conscious 
choice by policymakers—a choice following from their assumed preference for a positive 
output gap target. 
 
The as-if assumption is not appropriate for the study of policymakers’ choices, even 
though it is valuable for the modeling of choices by private agents.  Recognition of this 
point has naturally been followed by the greater integration into the study of the Great 
Inflation of nonquantitative information, including the record of policymakers’ stated   4
views of the economy.  Such an approach has been pursued by Romer and Romer (2002, 
2004), Orphanides (2003), and others in the study of U.S. 1970s policymaking, and is 
continued in this paper.  The emphasis that this approach gives to the importance of 
policymakers’ views also brings the study of the Great Inflation onto the same footing as 
the study of other episodes in monetary history.  For example, Romer and Romer (2004) 
observe that examination of the ideas driving policymaking was an important element of 
Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) study of the Great Depression,
1 while the analysis of 
inflation targeting by Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) makes extensive 
use of policymakers’ statements. 
 
The emphasis on policymakers’ misconceptions about economic behavior has further 
antecedents in the 1970s discussions of the Great Inflation in both the United States and 
the United Kingdom.  Friedman (1972, p. 13) argued that “the erratic and destabilizing 
monetary policy has largely resulted from the acceptance of erroneous economic 
theories”; in that connection, Friedman attributed cost-push views regarding inflation to 
Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns.  In the United Kingdom, Robbins (1973) 
likewise blamed policy mistakes on cost-push views, which, he argued, meant that the 
United Kingdom was suffering from a “crisis of intellectual error… due largely to 
misconceptions prevalent even at high expert levels.”  Finally, Laidler (1979, p. 899) 
judged that the United Kingdom’s inflation performance reflected the use of “erroneous 
economics” in policy formation. 
 
It is one thing to attribute the policy decisions underlying the Great Inflation to 
policymakers’ erroneous views about economic behavior; it is another to take a stand on 
the specific theoretical errors that were the main source of Great Inflation policies.  
Romer (2005) groups a number of candidate explanations for the Great Inflation under 
the umbrella of the “ideas hypothesis.”  The arguments made in the aforementioned 
studies by Taylor (1992), McCallum (1995), and DeLong (1997) all fall under that 
umbrella; specifically, all three studies conjecture that 1970s policymakers believed in a 
long-run Phillips curve tradeoff.  While sharing these authors’ rejection of the time-
consistency story, we further reject their appeal to a tradeoff explanation.  We believe 
that an important element of a good positive-economics explanation for the Great 
Inflation is recognition that inflation was not consciously created by policymakers.  This 
——————————————————————————————————— 
1 Meltzer (2003) also traces Great Depression-era monetary policy decisions to Federal Reserve doctrine, 
which he argues was constant across the 1920s and 1930s.   5
is a much-neglected feature of the Great Inflation.  Any story of the Great Inflation that 
appeals either to time-consistency arguments or to monetary policy exploitation of a 
Phillips curve equation is, at its core, claiming that policymakers deliberately injected 
inflation into the economy.  This claim flies in the face of the evidence that 1970s 
policymakers believed that inflation was not a monetary phenomenon.  Policymakers in 
the 1970s had a modern view of the costs of inflation, but lacked a modern view of their 
power to determine the inflation rate through monetary policy.  An approach that 
attempts to be realistic about the considerations driving 1970s monetary policy decisions 




Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2007, p. 1152) observe that the absence of electronic 
versions of Arthur Burns’ public statements is an obstacle to a comprehensive analysis of 
the information in those statements.  This observation is valid for the textual analysis that 
Gorodnichenko and Shapiro apply to statements, which requires the entirety of the 
statements (i.e., the population); it is also a legitimate concern if the aim is to discern 
Burns’ model of the economy, as this again ideally involves studying the population of 
statements, and certainly requires a large and representative sample.  Large samples of 
Burns’ statements have been covered by the separate analyses of Burns’ views on the 
economy in Romer and Romer (2002, 2004), Hetzel (1998), Christiano and Gust (2000), 
Orphanides (2003), and Nelson (2005), with much non-overlapping material across 
papers.  One aim of the present paper is to reconcile our characterization of Burns’ views 
with these studies.  But in obtaining the characterization we give, we make use of a large 
sample of Burns’ statements that includes many not cited in the earlier studies.  One 
reason why we are able to undertake this task is that there has been a major improvement 
in the electronic availability of Federal Reserve Chairmen’s statements through the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRASER archival database.  This database contains 
speeches and opening statements to Congress made by Chairman Burns, including the 
substantial number not included in the selection in Burns (1978).  At the time of writing, 
the database did not include the question-and-answer portion of Congressional testimony, 
but we draw on these by consulting the relevant hardcopy transcripts. 
 
In the United Kingdom, central bank independence did not exist prior to 1997.  Monetary 
policy decisions were made by the Treasury, and so by the executive branch of the 
government.  Nelson (2005, 2008) characterizes the economic doctrine of pre-1997 U.K.   6
governments by collecting and reconciling public statements on economic matters given 
by leading policymakers.  In this paper, on the other hand, we look at a source not 
previously consulted—namely, the U.K. Treasury’s Economic Progress Report, a 
monthly analysis of economic conditions that began publication in January 1970.  In the 
following section, we set out the doctrine revealed by analysis of this policy publication. 
 
3. Official U.K. doctrine on inflation during the 1970s 
 
This section outlines the doctrine underlying policymaking in the United Kingdom during 
the 1970s.  The documentation of U.K. Treasury views provided here shows that there 
were several aspects of U.K. official doctrine on inflation held consistently over 1970−79 
(not all completely independent propositions, but listed separately for ease of our 
documentation below): 
 
(i) Monetary policy can be a source of inflation, by producing excess aggregate demand. 
 
(ii) Pure cost-push inflation (i.e., sustained inflation in the absence of excess demand) can 
occur. 
 
(iii) It follows from (i) that monetary restraint (e.g., monetary policy designed to remove 
the excess of nominal spending growth over potential output growth in the long run) is a 
necessary element of inflation control. 
 
(iv) But from (ii) above, monetary restraint is not sufficient for inflation control, even in 
the long run. 
 
(v) There is a first-difference or speed-limit term driving inflation dynamics, irrespective 
of the sign of the output gap. 
 
(vi) There is no long-run tradeoff between inflation and the output gap (or equivalently, 
no long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment relative to its natural rate). 
 
We now document each of these points using the Treasury’s Economic Progress Report 
(EPR). 
 
   7
 
(i) Excess demand can add to inflation 
 
The U.K. Treasury recognized that “excess total demand” could be a source of inflation 
(EPR, July 1978, p. 4) and this was one reason “to avoid overheating the economy” 
(EPR, November 1977, p. 1). 
 
(ii) Inflation can be a purely cost-push phenomenon 
 
A pure cost-push of inflation holds that inflation does not depend on the output gap when 
the output gap is negative, and that inflation accordingly can be driven by cost-push 
forces on a sustained basis even in the absence of monetary accommodation.
2  This view 
was prevalent in U.K. policy circles in the 1960s,
3 and it continued to dominate UK 
policy thinking during the 1970s.  For example, the Treasury argued that the postwar 
period in the U.K. had “led to a general realization that inflation could not be simply 
identified with excess total demand” (EPR, July 1978, p. 4).  Its own analysis of inflation 
emphasized nonmonetary factors.  For example, a 1968 Treasury analysis in the 
publication Economic Trends observed, 
 
“The retail price index rose by about ½ per cent in June… The increase in June 
was largely the result of higher prices for fresh fruit and the reintroduction of 
prescription charges, which were only partially offset by lower potato prices.”  
(Treasury, “The Economic Situation,” in Economic Trends, August 1968, p. vii.) 
 
An analysis like this might be appropriate for analyzing erratic monthly movements in 
the price level, but the Treasury carried it over to the analysis of longer-term inflation 
movements.  And when it came to explaining inflation movements at a level deeper than 
referring to movements in specific components of the price index, the Treasury appeared 
satisfied to appeal to the relation between prices and costs:  
 
“The main factor sustaining this continuing high rate of price increase has been 
the rapid advance in wage costs…” (EPR, November 1970, p. 6.) 
——————————————————————————————————— 
2 For discussions of “purely cost-push” views of inflation that support the definition of that view that we 
use here, see Newbery and Atkinson (1972, p. 474) and Humphrey (1976 p. 10).  Humphrey further notes, 
in line with the argument presented here, that, until the 1970s, the pure cost-push view was “[m]ore 
influential in the United Kingdom and the United States.” 
3 See Nelson and Nikolov (2004) and Nelson (2009) for discussion.   8
“The factors underlying the rise of prices have, however, changed.  The initial 
acceleration was mainly a result of the effects of devaluation on import prices…  
Since last autumn, however, a different pattern has emerged… [T]here has been a 
very marked rise in costs resulting mainly from the fast rise in money wages…” 
(EPR, January 1971, p. 6.) 
 
“A higher level of pay settlements was much the most important factor in the 
faster rise of costs and prices during 1970…” (EPR, May 1971, p. 5.) 
 
“The slow rise in the prices of basic materials and fuel in recent months has, 
however, been more than offset by the strong rate of increase in wage costs, 
which have become the dominant influence on price rises.” (EPR, June 1975, p. 
6.) 
 
The prevalence of cost-push explanations for inflation at the official level across the 
1970s indicates that exogenous cost shocks were not being cited simply to account for 
short-run movements in inflation, but for sustained movements too.  This reflected the 
U.K. Treasury’s uncritical acceptance of the notion that “the phenomenon of persistent 
inflation reflected a cost-push—and specifically wage-push—progress, associated with 
modern collective bargaining procedures.” (EPR, July 1978, p. 4.) 
 
 (iii) Monetary restraint is a necessary element of inflation control 
 
The Treasury did accept that monetary restraint could contribute to avoiding inflation that 
arose from positive output gaps.  Consequently, it referred to 1977 policy developments 
with the observation, “Firm control of the main monetary aggregates continued to be an 
important feature of policy…” (EPR, April 1978, p. 5.) 
 
(iv) Monetary restraint is not sufficient for inflation control 
 
But the U.K. authorities thought that a negative output gap did not remove inflationary 
pressure.  Persistent inflation alongside negative output gaps—which U.K. policymakers 
thought was the state of affairs prevailing during most of the 1970s—therefore appeared 
to justify the use of nonmonetary instruments against inflation.  The Treasury credited 
incomes policy with lowering inflation: “Current pay policy appears to have been 
successful in avoiding an inflationary ‘pay explosion.’” (EPR, April 1978, p. 5.)  The   9
incomes policy which the Treasury praised in 1978 was the latest in a long line of official 
postwar attempts to control or manipulate directly the course of wages and prices in the 




(v) There is a speed-limit term driving inflation dynamics  
 
The U.K. Treasury did concede a role for demand in determining inflation when the 
output gap was negative, but this concession was limited to an influence of the change in 
the output gap on inflation (not of the gap level, as in Phillips curve analysis).  For 
example, in 1967 the Treasury observed, 
 
“If over any period the projected rate of increase in output is faster than that of 
potential output, the pressure of demand will rise and this is normally likely to 
result in a feedback through the economy on the rate of increase of wage rates…” 
(Treasury, “Econometric Research for Short-Term Forecasting,” Economic 
Trends, February 1967; quotation from p. x; emphasis added.) 
 
In the 1970s, the Treasury again allowed a gap-growth-rate term as a possible influence 
on inflation: 
 
“The index of retail prices has shown a much smaller monthly increase recently… 
reflecting some slowing down in the growth of domestic costs and possibly the 
falling pressure of demand.” (EPR, November 1975, p. 7.) 
 
The Treasury thus saw only a deteriorating output gap, not a constant negative output gap 
level, as capable of removing inflationary pressure. 
 
(vi) There is no long-run tradeoff between inflation and the output gap  
 
The U.K. Treasury did not embrace the tradeoff view of inflation associated with a 
permanently negatively sloped Phillips curve.
5 It viewed the whole postwar period as 
witnessing “persistence of inflation even during the downturn and ‘trough’ phases of the 
——————————————————————————————————— 
4 Parkin (1976) catalogues and critiques the nonmonetary measures against inflation taken by U.K. 
policymakers during the period from 1951 to 1972. 
5 To be precise, here we mean a curve that is negatively sloped when a scatter of unemployment and 
inflation is considered.   10
business cycle” (EPR, July 1978, p. 4), thereby defying simple Phillips curve analysis.  
This did not lead the Treasury to adopt modern expectational Phillips curve analysis 
before the late 1970s, but did lead it to reject the view that eliminating inflation and 
restoring a zero output gap (from its perceived negative value) were incompatible goals.  
Thus in 1975, the Treasury observed, “A sharp reduction in the rate of inflation is now an 
overriding priority for the nation and a precondition for a reduction of unemployment…” 
(EPR, August 1975, p. 1.)  It later added, “Failure to control inflation will put all these 
objectives at risk.” (EPR, July 1976, p. 3.) 
 
3.1 The change in official doctrine (1979) 
 
In 1979, following the election of the Thatcher Government, the Treasury noted that the 
newly introduced policy framework “represent[ed] a complete change of attitude towards 
the way in which the economy works…” (EPR, June 1979, p. 1); in particular, inflation 
was now accepted as being a monetary phenomenon, and incomes policies were 
abandoned.  Consistent with this framework, the Treasury attributed the decline in 
inflation in 1982 to “a low pressure of demand” (EPR, November 1982, p. 10).  Its 
perspective on the pressure of demand that had prevailed during the 1970s changed too; 
the Treasury observed that the “underlying growth in productivity in most countries 
seems to have fallen since the early 1970s” (EPR, October 1979, p. 1), and, in parallel 
with U.S. developments described in Orphanides (2003), the U.K. authorities revised 
down their estimates of potential output for the 1970s.
6 With more realistic estimates of 
potential output, previous output/inflation combinations could now be seen to be much 
more compatible with a monetary explanation for inflation. 
 
3.2 International factors: Bretton Woods 
 
Where does Bretton Woods fit into the U.K. experience?  Cecchetti et al (2007) note that 
the Great Inflation outside the United States is often routinely explained by appealing to 
the transmission of U.S. inflation via the Bretton Woods mechanism.  The breakdown of 
Bretton Woods is also often similarly cited as a source of world inflation.  Some studies 
of the United Kingdom, such as Benati (2004), do use Bretton Woods as a means of 
——————————————————————————————————— 
6 See Nelson and Nikolov (2004) for details on output gap mismeasurement in the United Kingdom during 
the 1970s, and the subsequent official revisions.   11
classifying different U.K. monetary policy regimes.
7 Here we explain why we emphasize 
flaws in domestic policy thinking rather than the changing status of Bretton Woods as the 
source of the United Kingdom’s Great Inflation. 
 
The United Kingdom had a fixed exchange rate until June 1972, with no changes in its 
dollar exchange value between 1967 and 1971.  It would nevertheless be inappropriate to 
conclude that Bretton Woods was a constraint whose disappearance produced the United 
Kingdom’s Great Inflation, and whose pre-1972 presence prevented U.K. economic 
doctrines from determining U.K. monetary policy.  On the contrary, extensive foreign 
exchange controls gave U.K. policymakers substantial scope to vary domestic interest 
rates for reasons other than the exchange rate constraint. 
 
It is difficult to pinpoint an instance where the fixed exchange rate policy in itself 
dictated a tighter monetary policy in the United Kingdom in the 1960s and 1970s.  A 
policy tightening in 1966 did coincide with a foreign exchange crisis, but also coincided 
with a perceived positive output gap, which in its own right would justify a tightening.  
When a foreign exchange crisis in 1967 coincided with a perceived negative output gap, 
devaluation was permitted; for the rest of the 1960s, the balance-of-payments constraint 
was perceived as a restriction on the allocation of output across sectors rather than on 
demand in aggregate.  And there was no conflict between exchange rate policy and 
demand management in 1970−71: interest rates were cut, and never raised, in both years; 
this monetary expansion was desired by the authorities for domestic reasons; and the 
balance of payments surpluses that occurred were consistent with the aim of stimulating 
the U.K. economy.  When a conflict between the U.K. authorities’ expansion of demand 
and their exchange rate obligations did arise in 1972, the conflict was resolved not by 
imposition of the external constraint on monetary policy decisions, but by floating of the 
pound sterling. 
 
3.3 International factors: the influence of overseas experience 
 
As the preceding discussion implies, we assign little importance to structural economic 
forces, as opposed to common policymaking doctrine, in accounting for similarities in 
inflation rates across countries during the 1970s.  This assignment, as well as our 
——————————————————————————————————— 
7 For other recent discussions of whether Bretton Woods was responsible for the spread of the Great 
Inflation, see Bordo and Eichengreen (2008) and Romer (2005).   12
emphasis on the United Kingdom as the originator of doctrine, matches up with an 
assessment made on one occasion by Milton Friedman (1979b, pp. 35−36): 
 
  “I do not believe there is any such thing as world inflation; there is only inflation in 
individual nations.  Given a floating exchange rate system, there need be no 
relationship between the inflation [rate] in one country and another… [T]here is a 
common element, namely the force of ideas…  Countries all over the world are 
experiencing inflation because countries all over the world have been affected by the 
socialist and Keynesian sets of ideas that have emanated very largely from Great 
Britain…” 
 
But this account has so far left unanswered the question of why U.K. policymakers were 
guided by an erroneous doctrine for so long.  If, as we argue, U.K. policymakers were 
mistaken in regarding inflation as a cost-push phenomenon, why did they not realize their 
error earlier?  In particular, why didn’t low inflation in countries like Germany make 
U.K. policymakers wake up to the need to use monetary policy as the central weapon 
against inflation, and to abandon their reliance on price and wage control measures?
8 
 
The answer is that U.K. policymakers and many leading U.K. commentators rationalized 
other countries’ experiences in two ways.  The first rationalization was the position that 
inflation in other countries may well reflect excess demand problems in those countries, 
but that the U.K. inflation problem actually was a cost-push problem.  For example, a 
1970 news report of a bulletin by the U.K.’s influential National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research said, “In most other European countries, it is argued, inflation is 
caused by increasing consumer demands.  In Britain, by contrast, inflation appears to be 
the result of the sharp rises in wages…”
9 The second rationalization attributed low 
inflation in Germany to nonmonetary factors, such as the incomes policies allegedly 
implied by Germany’s “social market” framework. 
 
Many prominent outside commentators on the U.K. economy accepted or reinforced the 
view that U.K. inflation was cost-push in nature.  For example, in 1970, the OECD 
Secretary General, Emile van Lennep, said, “Inflation has been accelerating in the United 
Kingdom despite the fact that demand pressure has been falling for several years.”
10 
——————————————————————————————————— 
8 Beyer et al (2009) provide further comparison of German and U.K. monetary policies during the 1970s. 
9 Kansas City Star, August 26, 1970. 
10 Quoted in Daily Telegraph (London), November 11, 1970.   13
Later, Blinder (1979, p. 74) observed, “From what I have heard about the U.K. economy, 
not even the most dedicated data miner can detect an effect of demand on inflation.”  
Blinder added that it “may indeed be empirically valid” to treat unemployment as 
exerting no influence on U.K. wage determination (1979, p. 75). 
 
3.4 Summing up 1970s doctrine 
 
Our characterization of U.K. policymakers’ views of inflation can be summarized by a 
modified Phillips curve such as:
11 
 
πt = b + αDt (yt – yt*) + δΔ(yt – yt*) + Etπt+1 + ξt. (1)
 
Here πt is quarterly inflation, b is a constant, yt − yt* is the output gap (i.e., the log of the 
ratio of output to potential output), Δ is the first-difference operator, and ξt is a cost-push 
process that is highly persistent and undergoes shifts in mean.  The parameters α and δ 
are strictly positive, while Dt is an indicator function that depends on the sign of the 
output gap: Dt = 1.0 for yt > yt*, but Dt = 0 for yt < yt*.  The presence of this term implies 
that if equation (1) is a valid description of inflation behavior, the output gap level 
matters for inflation only when there is positive excess demand; excess supply (i.e., a 
negative output gap) fails to withdraw inflationary pressure.  We will find that equation 
(1) is not in fact a valid description of inflation determination in the United Kingdom, and 
that the post-1979 policymakers were therefore correct to reject it.  Nevertheless, U.K. 
policymakers’ adherence to a view of inflation captured by equation (1) takes us far in 
understanding U.K. policy decisions during the 1970s.  We take this point up in Section 
5.  Prior to that, we demonstrate that the mistaken views about inflation that were 
prevalent in the United Kingdom did not remain a source of error special to U.K. policy 
circles.  On the contrary, these views were adopted during the 1970s by the principal 
policymakers in the United States.  
 
4.  Official U.S. doctrine on inflation during the 1970s 
 
As we discuss in detail in Appendix A, in 1969−70 U.S. policymakers had fairly 
orthodox views of inflation, most notably expressed in their endorsement of a modern 
——————————————————————————————————— 
11 Nelson (2009) justifies this equation on the basis of a different set of U.K. policymaker statements from 
that used here.  The representation is also similar to the equation that Friedman and Schwartz (1982) use to 
characterize cost-push views of inflation.   14
Phillips curve.  That is, policymakers believed that inflation was elastic with respect to 
demand pressure in all regions, and that the Phillips curve became vertical in the long 
run.  This position appears to have been that of Arthur Burns upon becoming Federal 
Reserve Chairman in early 1970, and similar views were held by several key Nixon 
Administration personnel.  But both Burns and other senior policymakers rapidly 
changed their view of the inflation process in favor of a predominantly nonmonetary 
approach.
12 We contend that Burns’ views throughout the period from late 1970 to his 
departure as Chairman in early 1978, as well as those of other major officials in 1970−78 
and into 1979, are well captured by equation (1) and the accompanying propositions (i)-
(vi) given above.  As we will see, Burns and other Federal Reserve Board figures 
explicitly appealed to the U.K. experience as a forerunner of the U.S. experience.  Let us 
review the doctrinal items (i)-(vi) of Section 3 once more, this time using them to 
describe U.S. doctrine. 
 
(i) Excess demand can add to inflation 
 
Chairman Burns accepted that “policies that create excess aggregate demand… lead 
ultimately to galloping inflation” (July 30, 1974, testimony to Banking and Currency 
Committee, House of Representations, in Burns, 1978, p. 170).  Accordingly, for 
inflation arising from excess demand, “the raging fires of inflation will eventually burn 
themselves out” if the boom was wound back by official restriction of demand (Burns, 
August 6, 1974, p. 17).
13 Burns accepted that excess demand conditions had been created 
in the late 1960s and in 1973; accordingly, the “current inflation began in the middle 
1960s” (August 21, 1974, p. 6) with “the underlying inflationary trend caused by lax 
financial policies” (July 27, 1976, p. 671), while 1973 had again seen an “overheating of 
the economy” (September 20, 1974, p. 4).  More generally, Burns observed that “we also 
know that when the money supply grows excessively, inflation will be generated.” (July 
26, 1977, testimony, in Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, House of 
——————————————————————————————————— 
12 Romer and Romer (2002) contend that Burns entered office already holding cost-push views of inflation.  
For the contrary argument that Burns underwent a change shortly after taking office, see Nelson (2005).  
There is no disagreement across these accounts on the importance of nonmonetary views in Burns’ thinking 
from late 1970 to late 1973, and both sources provide considerable documentation.  Accordingly, our 
documentation here focuses on the more contentious and less documented question of what were Burns’ 
views from 1974 to 1978. 
13 References given in the text with a date and page number but no other bibliographical information are 
from Chairman Burns’ statements and speeches as given in the Federal Reserve Bulletin or in the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRASER archive of Burns’ public statements (available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/statements/).  More information on these statements is given 
chronologically in the Bibliographical Appendix.   15
Representatives, 1977a, p. 99.)  This proposition, he noted, was especially relevant to the 
medium term: “excessive monetary growth will eventually result in more rapid inflation” 
(September 25, 1975, testimony, in Budget Committee, U.S. Senate, 1975b, p. 177); and 
therefore: “If we create money at a more rapid rate than we have been doing, sooner or 
later that money will go to work and express itself in higher prices.” (July 29, 1975, 
testimony, in Joint Economic Committee, 1975, p. 158.) 
 
Burns’ successor as Federal Reserve Chairman, G. William Miller, shared this 
perspective, contending, “If the Fed takes the restraint off and lets the money be printed, 




(ii) Inflation can be a purely cost-push phenomenon 
 
Federal Reserve officials during the 1970s also believed, however, that exogenous cost-
push forces (the ξt term in equation (1)) could produce sustained inflation without 
monetary accommodation.  The experience of the United Kingdom was invoked as an 
empirical example of this phenomenon.  For example, an unsigned article in the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin of October 1970 stated, 
 
  “The United Kingdom provides the clearest example among the industrialized 
countries of inflation that is primarily of the cost-push variety.  The British 
economy is clearly operating below its productive potential… Yet labor costs 
have been rising rapidly…” (Board of Governors, 1970, p. 749.) 
 
Around this time, Chairman Burns came to the view that the U.S. economy had inherited 
the cost-push characteristics perceived as relevant to the United Kingdom.  By mid-1975, 
when asked if he expected wages to respond to fundamentals, Burns was saying, “I hope 
you’re right about the behavior of wages.  That’s the way things should work, but they 
haven’t worked that way in recent years in this country or in Canada or in Great Britain.”  
(May 1, 1975, testimony. in Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, U.S. 
Senate, 1975, p. 194.) 
 
——————————————————————————————————— 
14 Quoted in the New York Times, July 4, 1978.   16
Burns cited wage-push as a major source of inflationary pressure: “I do think that our 
trade unions at the present time have excessive market power.  I also think that some of 
our legislation has been conducive to increases in wages and, therefore, to higher 
inflation rates…” (September 4, 1975, testimony, in Agriculture and Forestry Committee, 
U.S. Senate, 1975, p. 16.)  Thanks to labor union behavior, wage-push pressures would 
exist even in the absence of wage-increasing legislation: “inflation has not come to an 
end… One of the most important sources it is coming from and will continue to come 
from is the increase in wages.” (July 29, 1975, testimony, in Joint Economic Committee, 
1975, p. 152.)  In 1977 Burns claimed: “in the last analysis the wage increases that take 
place are fundamental to the rate of inflation.” (November 9, 1977, testimony, in 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate, 1977, p. 30.) 
 
But Burns also cited firms as originators of cost-push pressure: “my impression is that 
many of our business corporations are no longer paying attention to factors on the 
demand side in the same way they did in earlier years.” (October 2, 1975, testimony, in 
Budget Committee, House of Representatives, 1975, p. 78.)  Prices in particular sectors 
were also autonomous contributors to inflation, a key example being food prices: 
“concern about the effects of rising food prices on the overall rate of inflation is clearly 
warranted.” (September 4, 1975, testimony, in Agriculture and Forestry Committee, U.S. 
Senate, 1975, p. 3.)  Burns had a parallel concern about import prices: “If the dollar 
depreciates in foreign exchange markets, that releases forces that tend to raise our price 
level.” (July 26, 1977, testimony. in Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, 
House of Representatives, 1977a, p. 70.)  Any of these factors could aggravate domestic 
cost-push forces, Burns argued: “Nowadays, inflation from almost any source tends to be 
built into wages and thus to aggravate the wage-price spiral.” (September 4, 1975, 
testimony, in Agriculture and Forestry Committee, U.S. Senate, 1975, p. 4.)  He summed 
up: “inflation has become, as you correctly point out, a complex phenomenon.  I deplore 
some of the price increases that are taking place… I think, sometimes, that we are 
moving into a cost-plus economy, and that is a disturbing development.” (September 25, 
1975, testimony, in Budget Committee, U.S. Senate, 1975b, p. 168.)  The great 
importance Burns attributed to cost-push factors came out in August 1974 when he stated 
that only about 3 to 3.5 percentage points of the United States’ annual rate of inflation of 
12% in the first half of 1974 could be attributed to money growth (August 21, 1974, 
testimony, in Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate, 1974, p. 238). 
   17
Burns’ cost-push views were so entrenched that they obscured his interpretation of the 
Fisher relation between expected inflation and nominal interest rates.  He did recognize 
that the Fisher relation was fundamental: “Over the long run, the rate of inflation is the 
dominant influence on interest rates.” (September 25, 1975, testimony. in Budget 
Committee, U.S. Senate, 1975b, p. 166.)  But since Burns believed that the wage-price 
controls introduced in August 1971 had directly reduced inflationary expectations, he felt 
that nominal interest rates could fall without implying a loosening of monetary policy.  In 
a speech in November 1971, Burns said that “the freeze has been extremely effective,” 
adding: “Interest rates have come down substantially as the inflationary premium has 
been squeezed out.” (November 11, 1971, p. 2.)  This viewpoint allowed Burns to 
interpret cuts in interest rates by the Federal Reserve not as force-fed monetary 
stimulation, but as responses to falling private inflationary expectations: “Interest rates 
are still falling, and yesterday’s decline in the Federal Reserve discount rate recognizes 
that.” (November 11, 1971, p. 3.) 
 
(iii) Monetary policy is a necessary part of inflation control 
 
Burns accepted quantity-theory logic in the sense that he realized that the Federal 
Reserve could be a dominant influence on nominal spending growth (Δm + Δv) over 
longer periods.  He accordingly accepted that a necessary condition for price stability was 
for the Federal Reserve to provide nominal income growth rates that were not persistently 
excessive relative to long-run growth in potential output (Δy*).  Thus he observed in 
1975 that existing monetary growth rates, “while appropriate in the present environment, 
could not be maintained indefinitely without running a serious risk of releasing new 
inflationary pressures.” (May 1, 1975, testimony, in Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee, U.S. Senate, 1975, p. 172.)  Burns saw the Federal Reserve as concerned 
with “bringing the long-run growth of the monetary aggregates down to rates compatible 
with general price stability.” (July 29, 1977, testimony, in Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, 1977b, p. 68.)  Likewise, a downward 
money growth path was “absolutely necessary if President Carter’s publicly announced 
goal of reducing the pace of inflation by two percentage points by the end of 1979 is to be 
achieved.” (May 3, 1977, p. 467; emphasis added.)  We italicize “necessary” because its 
use instead of “necessary and sufficient” distinguishes Burns’ nonmonetary view of 
inflation from the standard, monetary view.  Monetary policy, in Burns’ conception, was 
a necessary instrument for securing price stability because monetary policy actions were 
required to prevent the emergence of positive output gaps.  Thus, when an excess-  18
demand problem was perceived as having emerged in 1973, Burns observed that 
“classical tools of economic stabilization—that is, general monetary and fiscal policies—
can be more helpful at such a time” (February 26, 1974, statement, in Joint Economic 
Committee, 1974, p. 720).
15 
 
(iv) Monetary policy is not sufficient for inflation control 
 
Burns believed that monetary policy was not sufficient for inflation control.  To cast the 
issue in quantity-equation terms, for Δm + Δv to secure dependable control of inflation 
(π), inflation should be endogenous and continuously related to aggregate demand.  In 
those circumstances, actions on Δm + Δv ultimately bear down on π alone, leaving Δy to 
be pinned down by the exogenous value of potential output growth Δy*.  This was not, 
however, Burns’ position; rather he saw π as insensitive to aggregate demand over a large 
range, as it is in equation (1), implying that aggregate demand control cannot by itself 
secure inflation control. 
 
In the following exchange Burns explicitly denied that one could speak of a specific 
noninflationary growth rate of money, or equivalently, a specific monetary policy that 
could deliver price stability: 
 
  Mr. NEAL. … [W]hat would have happened had the money growth rate been 
consistent with price stability? 
 
Dr. BURNS.  I don’t know that I or anyone else could ever answer that question, 
because we would be dealing with an imaginative reconstruction of the past.  In any 
such reconstruction of the past, you would certainly have to specify the character of 
fiscal policy in the country.  You would have to specify the labor policies pursued by 
the Government and by the trade unions and by business firms.  You would have to 
specify pricing policies.  Then you might get some approach to a meaningful 
answer… But I don’t think you would learn a thing merely by asking what would 
have happened if monetary policy had kept the rate of growth of the money supply 
at a level that is consistent with general price stability.  (July 27, 1976 question and 
——————————————————————————————————— 
15 Burns therefore recognized, in line with equation (1), that excess demand pressure could be 
superimposed on cost-push factors as a source of inflation, and acknowledged that an excess demand 
problem had emerged in 1973.  Burns’ 1974 statements on the need for demand restraint thus do not 
constitute a repudiation of his cost-push views of inflation (though for a contrary interpretation, see Romer 
and Romer, 2004, p. 141).   19
answer session, in Banking, Currency and Housing Committee, House of 
Representatives, 1976, p. 28.) 
 
Reflecting his judgment that monetary policy actions were insufficient for inflation 
control, Burns contended that incomes policy was needed, a recommendation he repeated 
emphatically even after the abolition of wage-price controls in April 1974.  For example, 
in August 1974, Burns said that “monetary policy should not be relied upon exclusively” 
and called for “[f]resh efforts” at incomes policy arrangements (August 6, 1974, pp. 17, 
18).  In 1975, Burns argued, “Sooner or later, in my judgment, we will move once again 
toward an incomes policy in this country… I think the world will continue to look in this 
direction for part of an answer to its problems.” (July 29, 1975, testimony, in Joint 
Economic Committee, 1975, p. 145.)  In the same year Burns offered a specific proposal: 
“I think we ought to hold up for public airing those instances where we have some reason 
to believe that there is an abuse of economic power, whether on the part of our 
corporations or our trade unions...” (October 2, 1975, testimony, in Budget Committee, 
House of Representatives, 1975, p. 179.)  
 
Burns reaffirmed these positions in 1976 and 1977.  In 1976, he observed, “In the kind of 
world that we live in—with trade unions playing a large role in the determination of 
wages, so that competition in the labor market is very limited, and with not a few of our 
business firms having market power, as I think we all know—if we try to rely solely on 
monetary and fiscal policies to achieve general price stability, I believe we are likely to 
fail… I am convinced that we will return to an incomes policy sooner or later…” (March 
22, 1976, testimony, in Budget Committee, U.S. Senate, 1976, p. 85.)  In 1977 Burns 
stated, “I feel, Senator, that some sort of incomes policy will have to be developed in our 
country…” (November 9, 1977, testimony, in Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee, U.S. Senate, 1977, p. 29.) 
 
Relative to an earlier period in U.S. history when aggregate demand management was a 
sufficient tool against inflation, Burns said, structural change had produced a “catch”;  
there were now “tremendous nonmonetary pressures… tending to drive costs and prices 
higher.” (August 13, 1977 speech, in Burns, 1978, p. 417.)  A favorite formulation of 
Burns was that monetary policy in the new circumstances should do what it can against 
inflation, but that monetary policy was not enough.  For example, Burns said in 1975: 
“The Federal Reserve is firmly committed to do what it can to restore general price 
stability in this country.” (May 1, 1975, testimony, in Banking, Housing and Urban   20
Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate, 1975, p. 173; emphasis added.)  He stressed in 1976: 
“Monetary policy alone, however, cannot solve our nation’s stubborn problem of 
inflation.” (November 18, 1976, speech, in Burns, 1978, p. 250.)  Even at his final FOMC 
meeting (in February 1978), which he presided over on an interim basis, Burns described 
himself and his colleagues as “do[ing] what we can to reduce the rate of inflation” 
(FOMC Minutes, February 28, 1978, p. 31).  G. William Miller adopted similar 
formulations during his tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman (see, for example, Nelson, 
2005). 
 
Monetary policy within this framework was seen as able to provide a floor but not a 
ceiling for the inflation rate.  As Burns put it, “if a 5 per cent rate of price advance were 
to be accepted complacently by Government, inflationary expectations would intensify, 
and the actual rate of price increases would then almost certainly move toward higher 
levels.” (February 3, 1977, p. 123.) 
 
Like their U.K. counterparts, U.S. policymakers erroneously saw the predominant 
situation of the 1970s as one of coexisting cost-push inflation and negative output gaps.  
Therefore, the perceived function of monetary policy became one of avoiding a 
compounding of the cost-push inflation that would occur if a positive output gap (and 
accompanying demand-pull inflation) were permitted.  Thus Burns described his money 
growth target choices in 1975−76 as designed to “facilitate substantial recovery in 
economic activity without aggravating the problem of inflation.” (July 27, 1976, p. 671.)  
Similarly, the following year Burns said that the “basic objective of monetary policy in 
the recent past has been to promote conditions conducive to substantial expansion in 
economic activity, while guarding against the release of new inflationary forces.” (March 
2, 1977, p. 229.)  “New” here refers to demand-pull forces on top of the existing cost-
push forces.  Or as Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal characterized the policy 
assignment in the United States in 1978, “Bill Miller has to keep the money supply from 
going through the roof.”
16 
 
Burns summed up his necessary-but-not-sufficient vision of monetary policy in 1976: 
“Monetary policy—no matter how well designed and implemented—cannot do the job 
alone.  Adherence to a moderate course of monetary policy can, however, make a 
significant contribution to the fight against inflation.” (July 27, 1976, p. 671.)  
——————————————————————————————————— 
16 Quoted in New York Times, July 4, 1978.   21
 
The series of papers of which this paper is part provides a detailed chronology of the 
nonmonetary actions against inflation taken in both the United Kingdom and the United 
States during the 1970s.  In particular, Nelson (2005) discusses not only the U.S. wage-
price controls of 1971−74, but later U.S. measures, including the Ford Administration’s 
“Whip Inflation Now” program of 1974, the Carter measures against specific prices in 
1977, and the Carter Administration’s incomes policy initiatives in 1978−79.  It is true 
that the use of incomes policies in the United States was not restricted to the 1970s, as 
wage-price guideposts were pursued by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in the 
1960s.  But the underlying theoretical rationale for the 1960s U.S. measures was distinct 
from the pure cost-push view of inflation that prevailed among U.S. policymakers in the 
1970s.  We discuss U.S. policies against inflation during the 1960s in Appendix A. 
 
(v) The growth rate of the output gap matters for inflation 
 
Burns took as a lesson from his studies of the business cycle that the first difference of 
the output gap mattered for inflation.  Burns (1951, p. 198) observed, “inflation does not 
wait for full employment,” and this belief carried over into his observations on 1970s 
developments.  For example, in 1976, Burns argued, “Some step-up in the rate of 
inflation was perhaps unavoidable in view of the vigor of economic recovery.” (February 
19, 1976, p. 233.)  Later in the year he warned that underlying inflation “could well 
increase as our economy returns to higher level of resource utilization.” (November 18, 
1976, speech, in Burns, 1978, pp. 244−245.)  Likewise, in 1977 Burns stated: “As we 
should know by now, pressures on resources and prices can arise even at a time of 
substantial unemployment.” (February 23, 1977, p. 226.)  He dismissed a negative output 
gap level as a restraint on inflation and emphasized instead the speed-limit channel: 
“Substantial amounts of idle capacity and manpower provide little assurance that price 
pressures will not mount as the economic growth rate speeds up.  Indeed, the historical 
record of business cycles in our country clearly demonstrates… that the prices of final 
goods and services gather substantial upward momentum well before full utilization of 
resources is achieved…” (March 22, 1977, p. 361.) 
 
In Burns’ view, the first-difference term mattered for inflation in a symmetric manner: 
not only, as noted above, did he believe that very rapid expansion promoted inflation, but 
additionally, slow growth in output (relative to potential) restrained inflation (e.g., 
February 3, 1976, p. 5).  This first-difference term could, however, be overwhelmed by   22
the other factors mattering for inflation, so cost-push forces could raise inflation even 
during periods of a widening output gap (see his July 30, 1974, remarks on 1970−71 
developments, in Burns, 1978, p. 170).  Likewise, weakening cost-push forces could 
mean that inflation fell during a strong recovery, as in 1975−76. 
 
The speed-limit element in Burns’ view of inflation helps reconcile his endorsement of 
cost-push interpretations with other, seemingly more standard, statements by Burns that 
are emphasized in other studies.  Romer and Romer (2004, p. 141) interpret Burns’ 
warnings of inflationary pressure in 1977 as reflecting “changes in [his] beliefs in the 
mid-1970s” toward believing that inflation responded to the level of slack as well as an 
assessment on Burns’ part that output was exceeding potential, though they admit that 
they cannot reconcile the easy monetary policy of 1976−77 with this change of beliefs.  
No inference of change in Burns’ views is necessary, however; policy statements by 
Burns throughout 1974−78 are consistent with the cost-push plus speed-limit views that 
we believe he held consistently over the 1970−78 period. 
 
Moreover, further examination suggests that Burns did not believe that the output gap 
was positive in 1977; the 1977 quotation Romer and Romer offer from Burns refers to 
“the pace of economic activity,” i.e., a speed-limit not a gap-level channel from demand 
to inflation; and in the above quotations Burns explicitly referred to a level of economic 
slack existing in 1977, i.e., to a negative output gap.  Indeed, Burns’ statement that “there 
is now considerable slack in the economy” (February 23, 1977, p. 226) and his 
observation of “[s]ubstantial amounts of idle capacity and manpower” (March 22, 1977, 
p. 361) specifically refute Romer and Romer’s contention that Burns believed that the 
gap had turned positive by 1977.  In addition, Burns’ views on potential output had not 
adjusted downward adequately in 1977, as he endorsed a potential output growth rate 
estimate of “3.5 percent or a shade below that.” (May 2, 1977, testimony, in Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate, 1977, p. 17.) 
  
Burns’ speed-limit view can also reconcile his many statements about the limited power 
of monetary policy with his occasional observations that the Fed could, in fact, eliminate 
inflation.  For example, Burns said in 1974, “we could stop this inflation in a very few 
months, and stop it dead in its tracks…” (February 26, 1974, testimony, in Joint 
Economic Committee, 1974, p. 747).  In 1977, he stated, “For our part, we at the Federal 
Reserve know that inflation ultimately cannot proceed without monetary nourishment.” 
(July 29, 1977, testimony, in Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, House of   23
Representatives, 1977b, p. 69.)  And similarly, he observed, “serious inflation could not 
long proceed without monetary nourishment” (in his August 13, 1977 speech, in Burns, 
1978, p. 417.) 
 
As discussed below, statements like these are often interpreted as implying that Burns 
really had a monetary view of inflation, according to which monetary accommodation is 
crucial in making cost-push shocks matter for inflation.  This interpretation is untenable, 
as it contradicts Burns’ many denials (including during 1974−78) that a specific inflation 
rate was implied by a particular monetary policy choice.  But we can reconcile Burns’ 
statements in the preceding paragraph with these denials by using equation (1), which 
represents our characterization of official doctrine in the United Kingdom and the United 
States during the 1970s.  With equation (1), it is possible, starting from conditions of a 
zero or negative output gap, for a monetary policy to offset cost-push forces by making 
the output gap more negative.   
 
Such a monetary policy effect on inflation has different characteristics from those that 
arise in a standard framework for describing inflation determination.  According to the 
latter, a given negative output gap exerts ongoing downward pressure on inflation, and no 
alternative policy can remove inflation.  But equation (1), in which negative levels of the 
output gap do not matter for inflation, implies that a given degree of aggregate demand 
restraint would exert only a temporary effect on inflation; a widening output gap (i.e., 
continuous negative growth in the output gap) is required to maintain downward pressure 
on inflation.  Moreover, since cost-push forces are an independent source of ongoing 
inflation under specification (1), that specification suggests that it is valuable to remove 
these forces directly through nonmonetary measures. 
 
Thus, Burns argued, the Fed could stop inflation via a restriction channel, but “the only 
way we could do that is to bring the distress of mass unemployment on this nation.” 
(February 26, 1974, testimony, in Joint Economic Committee, 1974, p. 747.)  Similarly, 
CEA Chairman Charles Schultze stated in 1978: “We can't wring this inflation out of the 
economy through measures which promote unemployment and economic slack.  Such 
policies have only a limited impact on the kind of inflation from which we now 
suffer...”
17 Note the reference to a “limited impact”—i.e., a temporary impact arising 
from the gap-growth channel. 
——————————————————————————————————— 
17 Quoted in Daily News (New York), March 31, 1978.   24
(vi) Inflation cannot purchase permanent gains of output above potential 
 
Chairman Burns repeatedly denied the existence of a tradeoff between unemployment 
and inflation.  For example, in 1975 he stated: “Whatever may have been true in the past, 
there is no longer a meaningful tradeoff between unemployment and inflation.” 
(September 19, 1975, speech, in Burns 1978, p. 221.)  He elaborated: “There was a time 
when there was a tradeoff, and you could see it on a chart, between inflation rates and 
unemployment rates.  Today, the nice relationship that previously existed no longer 
appears.  In my judgment there is no tradeoff any more.” (September 25, 1975, 
testimony, in Budget Committee, U.S. Senate, 1975b, p. 164.)  Late in his tenure, Burns 
observed: “Economists and public officials used to argue about the tradeoff between 
inflation and unemployment.  Whether or not such a tradeoff existed in the past, I doubt 
that it exists at the present time.” (May 3, 1977, testimony, in Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate, 1977, p. 15.)  
 
In contrast to the long-run-tradeoff view, according to which higher inflation can 
permanently buy an excess of output above potential, Burns saw low inflation as 
desirable and conducive to achievement of policymakers’ real goals.  For example, Burns 
testified in 1974: “There is no conflict between the objective of maintaining the integrity 
of the currency and the policy declared in the [Employment] Act of ‘maximum 
employment, production, and purchasing power.’” (February 26, 1974, testimony, in 
Joint Economic Committee, 1974, p. 757.)
18 In a May 1975 appearance on Meet the 
Press, Burns repeated his view that full employment and price stability were compatible 
goals.
19  Two months later, Burns added that “among its several major objectives the 
Federal Reserve should seek over the long run to help this country return to a stable price 
level” (July 24, 1975, testimony, in Banking, Currency and Housing Committee, House 
of Representatives, 1975, p. 219), and in 1976 he stated that “elimination of our disease 
of inflation must therefore remain a major objective of public policy.” (July 27, 1976, p. 
671).  He went on to be more specific: “Our objective ought to be a zero rate of inflation; 
no other objective, I think, will serve this country well.” (July 27, 1976, testimony, in 
Banking, Currency and Housing Committee, House of Representatives, 1976, p. 29.) 
 
——————————————————————————————————— 
18 Other 1970s policymakers expressed similar views.  For example, George Shultz, while OMB Director in 
1971, said that there was a “zone of full employment with relatively stable prices,” which 1960s 
policymakers had missed by overstimulating the economy (Omaha World-Herald, February 14, 1971). 
19 Burns’ 1975 Meet the Press appearance is not included in the FRASER archive for copyright reasons, but 
it was reported in the May 26, 1975, edition of the Washington Star.   25
Our recognition of Burns’ rejection of a tradeoff is incorporated in the specification of 
equation (1): while positive gaps have a positive relation with inflation conditional on 
expected inflation, the coefficient on the expected-inflation term is unity, so there is no 
relationship between the absolute levels of inflation and the output gap in the long run. 
 
Incidentally, if there were evidence that the Federal Reserve during the 1970s internally 
used Phillips-style regressions that implied a tradeoff, this would not be a reliable 
indication that the most authoritative officials believed in a tradeoff.  For his part, Burns 
said that he took computer models “with a grain of salt” (May 1, 1975, testimony, in 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate, 1975, p. 194.)  He also 
noted: “Economists these days have made life easy for themselves by using econometric 
models.  I must say to you that, rightly or wrongly, I do not trust the results that are 
wrung out of these models.  The models are based on average experience over a 
considerable period of time.  I think we have been passing through a unique period and 
the characteristics of this period are not built into the econometric models that economists 
often rely upon.” (October 2, 1975, testimony, in Budget Committee, House of 
Representatives, 1975, p. 180.)  Burns’ belief that the U.S. economy had undergone 
structural change that had given it a cost-plus style pricing system, would only have 
reinforced his skepticism about the reliability of econometric estimates. 
 
We have found that we can characterize Burns’ views with a simple equation, but we do 
not suggest that this was estimated or reestimated econometrically.  Indeed, equation (1) 
is not econometrically identified using aggregate data.  Burns’ intuition about inflation 
behavior was based not on macroeconometric estimates, but on the cost-push behavior 
(and implied source of the ξt shocks) that he thought he could observe directly at the firm 
and industry level. 
 
4.1 Why Phillips curve tradeoff ideas were not important 
  
Baumol and Blinder (1982, p. 301), McCallum (1989, 1995), and Taylor (1992) all argue 
that U.S. inflation outcomes in the 1970s reflect policymakers’ belief in a permanent 
Phillips curve tradeoff.  More recently, that hypothesis has also been advanced by 
Sargent (1999).  We have argued that belief in a Phillips curve tradeoff was not an 
important factor driving U.S. policymaking in the 1970s.  It is true, as Taylor (1997) 
notes, that an empirical Phillips curve scatter diagram was discussed in the 1969   26
Economic Policy Report of the President.
20 But that report was issued by the outgoing 
administration.  Statements by senior figures in the Nixon Administration in 1969 suggest 
they had absorbed the natural rate hypothesis.  For example, the Council of Economic 
Advisers stated that “there is no fixed relationship or ‘tradeoff’ between unemployment 
and inflation…” (in Joint Economic Committee, 1969, p. 334).  Furthermore, U.S. 
monetary policy was tight during 1969 (Chairman Martin’s final year as Federal Reserve 
Chairman).  If the 1969 policies had been continued, there would have been no Great 
Inflation of the Seventies.  Instead, the policies of restraint ended, and were put into 
reverse, over 1970−72, and the cost-push view of inflation came to predominate among 
U.S. policymakers. 
 
4.2 Comparison with other interpretations 
 
We now compare our interpretation of U.S. official doctrine with some others available 
in the literature.  As noted above, an early study that attributed, as we do, cost-push views 
to Chairman Burns is Friedman (1972).  We already have laid out some alternative 
interpretations of 1974−77, as well as agreement on 1971−73, with the studies of Romer 
and Romer (2002, 2004).  We have also indicated problems with approaches (such as 
Sargent, 1999) that attribute Phillips-curve-tradeoff views to policymakers. 
 
Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (CCE) (1998, p. 467) claim that Chairman Burns 
“clearly understood” that inflation required monetary accommodation.
21 But they adduce 
no unambiguous evidence of this allegedly clear understanding on Burns’ part.  Indeed, 
both CCE and Christiano and Gust (2000) provide one quotation after another from 
Burns to the effect that excess demand no longer drives inflation and that higher growth 
rates of wages and other costs automatically push up inflation—which is to say, they 
provide Burns remarks that affirm of the strict cost-push position on inflation.  CCE do 
provide one seemingly orthodox statement by Burns regarding the monetary character of 
inflation; it is from a 1977 speech, near the end of Burns’ tenure.  In portions of the 
speech subsequent to the orthodox statement quoted by CCE, Burns repeated his claim 
that the character of inflation had changed to cost-push, and acknowledged only that 
lower money growth would “probably” reduce inflation.
22 Even late in his tenure, 
——————————————————————————————————— 
20 McCallum (1989, p. 181) also cites this scatter diagram as evidence that “inflation-unemployment 
tradeoffs have been important in policy deliberations.” 
21 A similar view was expressed by Lombra (1980). 
22 See Burns’ August 13, 1977, speech, reprinted in Burns (1978).   27
therefore, Burns would not grant that monetary restraint would reduce or eliminate 
inflation for certain, and he was emphatic that modern inflation conditions did not reflect 
a positive output gap.  Even more crucially, via the speed-limit term in equation (1), we 
are able to reconcile Burns’ 1977 statement with his other statements on inflation, 
without attributing a monetary view of inflation to Burns. 
 
Hetzel (1998) is an important early study that stresses Burns’ cost-push views on 
inflation.  In one passage, however, Hetzel (1998, p. 35) seems to concur with the CCE 
position that Burns understood that sustained inflation required monetary 
accommodation.  But he does not reconcile this claim with Burns’ many statements to the 
contrary; and as we have stressed, the full record of Burns’ views suggests a cost-push 
plus speed-limit view of inflation, not a modern or standard view of inflation. 
 
The more general message that we believe should be borne in mind is that Burns largely 
accepted that monetary policy could determine aggregate demand but did not, we argue, 
accept that the same was true of the determination of inflation.  His statements about 
accommodation should therefore be interpreted carefully: indeed, on one occasion, Burns 
observed, “I don’t know what ‘accommodate’ means precisely.” (March 13, 1975, 
testimony, in Budget Committee, U.S. Senate, 1975a, p. 835.)  If one believes that 
monetary policy can determine Δm + Δv and so the sum π + Δy, but that monetary policy 
is powerless regarding π, then “accommodation” of a higher Δm + Δv rate does not imply 
that the policymaker is permitting higher inflation.  Rather, the exogenously-determined 
inflation rate would (according to this view) prevail irrespective of the Δm + Δv value; in 
these circumstances, accommodating higher nominal income growth simply corresponds 
to giving room for output to grow.  Or as Burns once framed the issue, “This is a rather 
high rate of [M1] expansion by historical standards, but it is not too high when idle 
resources are extensive and financing needs still reflect rising prices.” (May 1, 1975, 




23 Monetary targeting by the Federal Reserve therefore could be—and in the 1970s was—consistent with a 
rejection of the view that inflation was a monetary phenomenon.  The study of Kozicki and Tinsley (2009) 
is marred by a failure to appreciate this point.  Kozicki and Tinsley take adoption of monetary targeting by 
the Fed as tantamount to an acceptance of monetarism.  They do not reconcile their account with the 
evidence (including those documented in papers which they cite) of U.S. policymakers’ adherence to 
nonmonetary views of inflation in 1970−79 and, with it, a rejection of monetarist view of inflation.  
Kozicki and Tinsley’s claim of a continuous powerful influence of monetarism on U.S. policy decisions 
from 1970 onward is further contradicted by an authoritative account by a Federal Reserve Governor 
(Andrew Brimmer) on the relation between Federal Reserve policymaking and monetarism.   Brimmer   28
5.  An estimated structural model for the United Kingdom 
 
We have argued that the key to understanding U.K. inflation in the 1970s was the 
nonmonetary approach to inflation control, and that this flawed approach has even more 
to answer for because of its influence on U.S. policymaking in the 1970s.  In the 
remainder of this paper, we provide a closer look at key policymaking episodes in the 
United Kingdom.  We do this by examining output from the Smets and Wouters (2007) 
model estimated on U.K. data, and illustrating how U.K. data outcomes can be 
understood as resulting from the flawed policy framework of the 1970s. 
 
The model is a dynamic general equilibrium system with sticky wages and prices.
24 The 
loglinearized version of the model is given in full in Smets and Wouters (2007), so we 
highlight only a few equations here.  First, the monetary policy rule has the nominal 
interest rate (Rt) responding to quarterly inflation (πt), the model-consistent output gap 
(gapt), and the first difference of the gap: 
 
Rt = ρRRt−1 + (1−ρR)[rππt + rygapt] + rΔyΔgapt + et
R                                (2) 
 
It is important to note that our estimation sample for this rule, as for the rest of the model, 
is 1962 Q1−2005 Q4, notwithstanding our emphasis on the enormous difference between 
1970s and post-1979 policies.  Following Ramey (1993), we interpret results from a 
sample that includes regime breaks as depicting average behavior of the economy.  For 
our data and sample, the relatively low inflation periods 1962−69 and 1983−2005,
25 and 
the positive mean of the real interest rate associated with those years, will imply that the 
estimates of rule (2) will have fairly reasonable stabilizing characteristics (e.g., rπ above 
1.0).  It is consequently appropriate to think of the 1970s monetary policy actions as 
substantially consisting of deviations from this average rule, and to view these deviations 
as largely captured in the estimated monetary policy shock series.  These deviations can 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1972) notes, in line with our own interpretation of developments, that monetarism reached a high point of 
influence on FOMC deliberations in early 1970, and that its influence dwindled thereafter. 
24 Previous work on estimation for the United Kingdom of dynamic general equilibrium models closely 
related to that of Smets and Wouters (2007) includes Harrison and Oomen (2008), Li and Saijo (2008), and 
ourselves (2007).  The last of these studies provides a defense of the use of the closed-economy abstraction 
for the study of U.K. inflation. 
25 Of these subperiods, policymaking in 1962−69 featured the same flawed doctrine that we attribute to 
1970s U.K. policymakers.  Inflation on average was nevertheless low compared to 1970−79, in part 
because inflation rose over the 1960s from a zero initial level, and in part because the rise was slowed 
down by a monetary policy tightening in 1966 (when policymakers recognized an excess demand 
situation).   29
be expected to be persistent, which makes it convenient for us to follow Smets and 
Wouters’ assumption that et
R is a stationary AR(1) process. 
 
Two other equations worth highlighting are the wage and price Phillips curves: 
 
πt = π1πt−1 + π2Etπt+1 −π3μt
p + et
p        (3) 
 
wt = w1wt−1 + (1−w1) (Etwt+1 + Etπt+1) – w2πt + w3πt−1 + w4(mrst − wt) + et
w.   (4) 
 
In equation (2), 0 < π1 < 1 is a function of the degree to which prices are indexed to 
lagged inflation; π2 > 0; π3 > 0; μt
p is the log of the inverse of real marginal cost; and et
p 
is a price-equation cost-push shock.  In equation (3), wt is the real wage, 0 < w1 < 1, w2 
and w3 are functions of the degree of indexation of wages to lagged inflation, w4 > 0, and  
mrst is the typical household’s marginal rate of substitution in period t between 
consumption and contributing more labor input to production.
26 The shocks to the two 
Phillips curves are assumed to follow univariate ARMA processes: 
 
(1−ρpL) et
p = (1 − μpL) ηt
p         (5) 
 
(1−ρwL) et
w = (1− μwL) ηt




w are white noise exogenous disturbances, and L is the lag operator.  
 
It is worth dwelling on these equations, in order to consider the sense in which they 
contradict the cost-push view of inflation.  The price Phillips curve in itself is not 
inconsistent with cost-push views, since it relates the dynamics of inflation to an average 
of marginal cost and to a cost-push shock specific to the price Phillips curve.  But the 
cost-push view of inflation is largely contradicted when the wage and price Phillips 
curves are taken together. The wage equation makes wage inflation endogenous and, in 
particular, responsive in a symmetric manner to aggregate demand (via the presence of 
the mrst − wt term and the responsiveness of this term to aggregate demand).
27 Because of 
this endogeneity, inflation is a monetary phenomenon in the model provided that w4 > 0.  
Some elements of the cost-push view of inflation could nevertheless be salvaged if the 
cost-push shocks were very persistent.  This would imply long systematic departures of 
——————————————————————————————————— 
26 See Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) for the justification for this type of wage Phillips curve. 
27 Other equations of the model in turn make aggregate demand sensitive to monetary policy.   30
inflation from target even if policymakers kept the output gap close to zero.
28 The price 
Phillips curve shock is particularly important in this regard; as Smets and Wouters (2007) 
note, the shock term in the wage Phillips curve can be interpreted either as a wage-push 
shock or a specific type of preference shock (a labor supply shock).  Provided the shocks 
in the wage equation are interpreted as labor supply shocks, they can be thought of as 
affecting inflation via their effect on potential output; the price equation’s shocks then 
provide the source of the truly “cost-push” shocks in the model (i.e., the et
p shocks in 
equation (3) are analogous to the ξt shocks in equation (1)).
29 Strong serial correlation in 
the price Phillips curve shock would support the idea that cost-push forces are important 
for medium-run inflation dynamics even without monetary accommodation.  Absence of 
serial correlation in the cost-push shock would, by contrast, suggest that cost-push forces 
have only a short-run influence on inflation if not accommodated by the monetary 
authorities. 
 
For our estimation, we use observations on the U.K. nominal Treasury bill rate, quarterly 
retail price inflation,
30 quarterly wage inflation, and per-capita values of log real GDP, 
log real consumption, log real investment, and log aggregate hours.  GDP, consumption, 
investment, and real wages are assumed to share a loglinear trend.
31 
 
Estimates of the model using Smets and Wouters’ Bayesian procedure are given in 
Tables 1 and 2.  We focus the discussion on the estimates of the Phillips curves discussed  
——————————————————————————————————— 
28 The lagged price-inflation term in the price Phillips curve does mean that a white noise cost-push shock 
that is not accommodated is still propagated somewhat into expectations of future inflation.  But provided 
that the lagged-inflation coefficient is reasonably far below unity, this propagation is quite muted: for 
example, with π1 ≤ 0.5 and a 1% white-noise cost-push shock arising this period, the effect of the shock on 
one-year-ahead expected inflation is below 0.1%.  Note also that the lagged inflation term makes inflation 
today sensitive to past monetary policy actions, not just to past nonmonetary forces. 
29 Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the estimated policy rule (2) incorporates a response to the output 
gap whose definition that is based on the presumption that the wage Phillips curve shocks are markup 
shocks that do not affect potential output.  If we accept the alternative interpretation of the wage Phillips 
curve shock as labor supply shocks, we must think of rule (2) as incorporating mismeasurement of the 
output gap.  Specifically, policymakers must be assumed to be erroneously excluding the labor supply 
shock from their definition of potential output.  In that case, policymakers are responding to an output gap 
estimate that contains a zero-mean error arising from their misspecification of potential output behavior. 
30 In contrast to the series plotted in Figure 1, the retail price inflation series used in estimation excludes 
mortgage costs.  It also removes effects on the index of tax increases in 1979 and 1990.  The adjustments 
are described in DiCecio and Nelson (2007). 
31 Data sources for most of the series are given in DiCecio and Nelson (2007).  The remaining data required 
for the VAR used here are: population (for which we use Darby and Lothian (1983) data to 1971, spliced 
into the U.K. Office of National Statistics (ONS) series mgsl.q after 1971) and a nominal wage index (total 
compensation, ONS series dtwm.q, divided by employment, obtained by British Labour Statistics data up 
to 1978, spliced into ONS series bcaj.q).    31
Table 1. Bayesian Estimates of Smets-Wouters (2007) Model on U.K. Data 









   Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
Mode Mean  5%,  95% 





7.60 7.18  5.55,  8.73






1.13 1.43  1.02,  1.68
h  Habit formation  0.70
b 
(0.10) 
0.82 0.53  0.43,  0.81





0.65 0.59  0.50,  0.72





1.90 1.34  0.65,  2.33





0.58 0.63  0.51,  0.69
ιw  Wage indexation  0.50
b 
(0.15) 
0.54 0.50  0.30,  0.71
ιp  Price indexation  0.50
b 
(0.15) 
0.27 0.28  0.15,  0.37
ψ  Capital utilization  0.50
b 
(0.15) 
0.54 0.57  0.38,  0.76
Φ  Degree of fixed costs  1.25
a 
(0.13) 
1.79 1.79  1.64,  1.93





1.20 1.74  1.34,  2.05





0.85 0.90  0.86,  0.93





0.03 0.10  0.04,  0.14





0.10 0.18  0.10,  0.22
π  Steady-state inflation  0.63
c 
(0.10) 
0.59 0.59  0.46,  0.72
 
100·((1/β)−1)  Discounting 0.25
c 
(0.10) 
0.21 0.25  0.10,  0.41





5.00 5.49  3.21,  8.17
γ  Balanced growth rate  0.40
a 
(0.10) 
0.52 0.45  0.38,  0.54





0.18 0.17  0.10,  0.24 
a. Normal distribution.  b. Beta distribution.  c. Gamma distribution.   32
Table 2. Bayesian Estimates of Smets-Wouters (2007) Model on U.K. Data 
Estimation Period 1962 Q1−2005 Q4 









   Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
Mode Mean  5%,  95% 





0.61 0.63  0.57,  0.70 
σb  Standard deviation of 




0.51 0.29  0.20,  0.50 





0.81 0.81  0.74,  0.89 
σΙ  Standard deviation of 




1.47 1.47  1.30,  1.65 
σR  Standard deviation of 




0.28 0.31  0.27,  0.34 
σp  Standard deviation of 




0.39 0.43  0.34,  0.45 
σw  Standard deviation of 




0.51 0.54  0.45,  0.60 





0.99 0.99  0.98,  0.99 





0.13 0.60  0.19,  0.77 





0.97 0.97  0.95,  0.99 
ρI  AR(1) for 




0.09 0.14  0.03,  0.21 





0.36 0.32  0.23,  0.45 





0.97 0.94  0.89,  0.99 





0.99 0.99  0.98,  0.99 





0.93 0.92  0.82,  0.96 





0.88 0.87  0.81,  0.94 
ρga  Correlation, spending 




0.50 0.49  0.34,  0.65 
 
a.  Inverse gamma distribution.  b. Beta distribution.  c. Normal distribution. 
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above.  First, we note that wages are estimated to depend on the discrepancy between the 
marginal rate of substitution and the real wage: the implied value of w4 in equation (4) is 
0.02 irrespective of whether the mode or mean value of the posterior distribution is used.  
Therefore, this condition for inflation to depend symmetrically on monetary policy 
actions is satisfied, rejecting one aspect of cost-push analysis.  Second, we note from 
Table 2 that the price cost-push shock term has only minor estimated persistence: 
although its AR(1) coefficient is over 0.90 (mode 0.97, mean 0.94), so too is the 
accompanying MA(1) coefficient (mode 0.93, mean 0.92), implying that a common 
factor virtually cancels from the dynamics of equation (5) and delivers a near-white noise 
cost-push shock process.
32 Third, the value of π1 in equation (3) is moderate: using the 
mode values of these estimates, the implied value of π1 is 0.21; using the mean values, it 
is 0.22.  The dynamics of the price Phillips curve therefore do little to propagate a cost-
push shock.  Taken together, these results suggest that U.K. policymakers were wrong to 
attribute inflation movements to long-lasting special factors and to dismiss the scope for 
monetary policy to influence inflation.  
 
Table 3 gives variance decompositions for the estimated model.  For horizons of four 
quarters ahead or more, monetary policy shocks account for about 11% or more of 
variation in both inflation and output growth; indeed, for inflation they account for nearly 
20% of the forecast error variance at a two- to three-year horizon.  Several VAR studies 
for the United States find a lower fraction of output forecast error variance accounted for 
by monetary shocks at business cycle horizons than we obtain for the United Kingdom, 
while Cochrane (1998) argues that monetary policy shocks contribute trivially to the 
forecast error variance of U.S. inflation.  The comparatively larger fractions that we find 
in our estimated structural model may be due to our use of U.K. data instead of U.S. data. 
But more likely, they are largely due to our deliberately imposing a constant-parameter 
policy rule over the whole sample.  As noted above, this choice magnifies the variance of 
the deviations from the estimated full-sample rule.  Effects of monetary policy are 
therefore likely to be manifested to a greater degree as contributions of monetary policy 
shocks to the variance of the model variables—rather than indirectly as the effects of the 




32 There is substantial, but less complete, cancellation of the AR and MA terms underlying the wage shock 
process too.   34
Table 3. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions at Horizon k 
  εa ε b  εg  εI ε R ε p ε w ε a ε b  εg  εI ε R ε p ε w 
  k = 1  k = 12 
Δy  6.7  33.1 30.4 20.9  7.6  1.1  0.3 7.3  30.1 26.2 18.5 11.6  1.6  4.8 
Δc  1.2 87.8 0.1  0.1 10.4 0.3  0.2  3.9  72.4 0.5  0.2 14.4 0.9  7.8 
Δi  0.5 6.4 0.1  86.6  5.6 0.7 0.1  1.9  6.1 0.4  78.9  8.7 1.6 2.4 
l  20.6 27.7 27.0 18.3  6.0  0.2  0.1 7.8  11.7 17.5  6.2  22.0  5.5  29.3 
π  2.2 1.1 0.8 0.1 8.2  62.8  24.7  2.7  1.6 2.1 0.2  19.2  17.8  56.4 
Δw  1.2 4.1 0.1 0.4 2.6  25.5  66.1  3.2  4.1 0.3 0.7 6.2  23.4  62.2 
R  2.2 17.5 1.0  0.8 62.8 8.7  6.9  5.0  7.8  4.9  1.1 19.4 4.3 57.5 
  k = 4  k = 30 
Δy  7.4  31.3 27.9 19.4 10.9  1.6  1.6 7.3  29.8 26.0 18.3 12.0  1.6  5.0 
Δc  3.2 78.3 0.3  0.2 14.2 0.9  2.8  3.9  71.7 0.5  0.2 14.8 0.9  8.0 
Δi  1.6 6.2 0.3  81.8  8.0 1.6 0.5  1.9  6.1 0.5  78.2  9.1 1.7 2.5 
l  14.8  22.8  24.5  12.5  21.2 2.1  2.1  4.6  5.6 10.1 3.2 10.7 4.2 61.6 
π  3.2 1.9 1.7 0.2  17.6  27.7  47.8  2.8  1.4 2.2 0.4  16.6  15.4  61.3 
Δw  2.5 3.9 0.2 0.7 5.7  24.5  62.5  3.1  4.0 0.3 0.7 6.7  23.2  61.8 
R  4.9 13.4 3.2  1.5 40.9 7.8 28.3  4.8  5.1  4.9  1.2 13.1 3.0 67.9 
  k = 8  k =100 
Δy  7.4  30.7 26.7 18.8 10.8  1.6  4.0 7.4  29.7 25.9 18.3 12.0  1.7  5.2 
Δc  3.9 74.3 0.4  0.2 13.7 0.9  6.5  4.0  71.3 0.5  0.2 14.7 0.9  8.3 
Δi  1.9 6.2 0.4  79.9  8.0 1.6 1.9  2.0  6.0 0.5  78.0  9.1 1.7 2.7 
l  10.4  15.9  21.1  8.5  26.4  4.5  13.2  6.2  3.5 7.1 2.1 6.7 2.8  71.6 
π  2.8 1.7 1.9 0.2  19.7  19.8  53.8  4.2  1.1 2.0 0.3  12.8  12.2  67.4 
Δw  3.1 4.0 0.3 0.7 5.7  23.9  62.3  3.2  4.0 0.3 0.7 6.7  23.3  61.7 
R  5.4 9.9 4.6 1.3  24.2  5.4  49.1  7.5  3.0 3.7 0.9 7.6 2.4  74.9 
Note:  Numbers reported are estimated percent contribution of the innovation to the 
variance of the row variable.  The innovations (column headers) are to technology (εa), 
the risk premium (εb), spending (εg), investment technology (εI), the monetary policy rule 
(εR), the price Phillips curve (εp), and the wage Phillips curve (εw).  The endogenous 
variables (row headers)  are output growth (Δy), consumption growth (Δc), investment 
growth (Δi), log hours (l), price inflation (π), wage inflation (Δw), and the short-term 
interest rate (R). 
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The wage Phillips curve and price Phillips curve shocks account for a large share of the 
variation in the nominal variables, while the wage Phillips curve shock accounts for a 
large fraction of the variation of hours, reinforcing our inclination to interpret it as a labor 
supply shock.  Interest-rate decisions are driven by the wage Phillips curve innovation, 
because that innovation is part of a persistent shock process; by contrast, the price 
Phillips curve innovation accounts for a far smaller amount of interest-rate variation. 
 
5.1 Great Inflation episodes 
 
In Figure 2a, we plot the short-term nominal interest rate and four-quarter inflation in the 
United Kingdom for 1969 Q4−1979 Q2.  In Figure 2b we plot the arithmetic first 
differences of these two series, a representation which helps to isolate the responsiveness 
(in sign and magnitude) of monetary policy to movements in inflation.
33 In Figure 2c we 
plot the behavior of the model’s estimated U.K. monetary policy shocks over the 1970s.
34 
As foreshadowed above, several of the observations on the monetary policy shock are 
notably negative in the 1970s, reflecting expansionary departures of monetary policy 
from the more orthodox rule estimated over 1962−2005.  Four episodes stand out: 
 
● There is a steeply negative value of the monetary policy shock in 1971 Q2.  In April 
1971, the Government cut interest rates by 1% despite the fact that inflation was rising.  
The Government was relying on its direct influence on specific prices (for example, on 
utilities prices) to control inflation.  It even saw expansionary monetary policy as 
reducing inflationary pressure, on the grounds that output growth moderated unit labor 
cost growth (the denominator in the unit labor cost expression—nominal wages—being 
perceived as out of reach of monetary policy actions). 
 
● There are some substantial, negative monetary policy shocks from 1974 Q2 to 1976 
Q1.  Even one former insider on U.K. policymaking seemed to be at a loss to explain 
monetary policy over this period: Cairncross (1992, pp. 215−216) observes, “For some 
reason monetary policy had remained remarkably relaxed in Labour’s first two years [i.e., 
to March 1976], with bank rate (or MLR [Minimum Lending Rate]) falling from 13% to  
——————————————————————————————————— 




A = 100*([Pt – Pt−4]/Pt−4), Pt  being the unlogged price level. 
34 The shocks are constructed from the data and the median parameter estimates via the Kalman smoother.  
The Kalman smoother seems a more natural method for generating shocks than the Kalman filter in cases 
such as ours where the assumption underlying model estimation is that the structural parameters and the 
policy rule responses are time-invariant (see Hamilton, 1994, p. 394).   36
Figure 2a. Nominal interest and four-quarter inflation rates, U.K., 1969 Q4−1979 Q2 
 
Figure 2b. Nominal interest and inflation rates, first differences, U.K., 1969 Q4−1979 Q2 
 




























































9¾% in April 1975, rising to 12% in October 1975 and then falling again to 9% in March 
1976.”  What is more, even the maximum level of the nominal interest rate over this 
period was well below the inflation rate, and several of the rate cuts were against the 
background of rising inflation.  Faulty measures of the output gap do not seem to account 
for the extent of the ease of U.K. monetary policy over this period.
35 The reason for the 
relaxed stance of monetary policy seems to be the U.K. authorities’ heavy reliance on 
wages policies (the series of “Social Contract” agreements between the Government and  
unions) and their parallel belief that monetary policy tightening would not bring inflation 
down.  
 
● In 1977, a sequence of negative monetary policy shocks appears, corresponding to a 
period where nominal interest rates were brought down into single digits despite double-
digit inflation.  This period was again one characterized by reliance on the Social 
Contract as the inflation-fighting tool. 
 
● Another notable negative monetary policy shock occurs in 1979 Q2.  In April 1979, the 
U.K. Government cut interest rates by 1% despite the fact that inflation was rising.  This 
decision followed the Government’s signing of a new agreement with the unions, again 
intended to fight inflation by direct restraint of wages. 
 
These results from the estimated model illustrate our contention that, while inflation in 
the United Kingdom in the 1970s was not in fact a cost-push process, the policy choices 
that led to the Great Inflation are traceable to the authorities’ adherence to cost-push 
views. 
 
5.2 Other explanations for the U.K. policy episodes 
 
Let us consider some more benign interpretations of the monetary policy easings that 
took place in the United Kingdom during the 1970s.  One such interpretation is based on 
the fact that the U.K. stockmarket underwent an extraordinary decline during the 1970s.  
The Financial Times stockmarket index in 1974 was as low in nominal terms as it had 
been in the late 1950s (see, for example, Bordo and Wheelock, 2004).  Could this 
stockmarket behavior justify the pattern of U.K. monetary policy decisions in the mid-
1970s, explaining why nominal interest rates were so low compared with inflation rates?  
——————————————————————————————————— 
35 See Nelson and Nikolov (2004).   38
To us this proposed justification is weak.  It may explain partially why policymakers 
behaved the way they did, but it does not establish that these actions were based on sound 
economics.  We first note that if a period is associated with stockmarket weakness, that is 
not generally a sufficient reason in the monetary policy rules literature for rejecting 
comparison of actual policy decisions with simple rules based on macroeconomic 
aggregates.  For example, the U.S. stockmarket was weak in the 1970s, yet it is standard 
to compare actual policy against rules that respond only to inflation and an index of real 
aggregate activity such as the output gap, detrended output, or output gap growth (see, 
e.g., Orphanides, 2003).  Policymakers concerned with macroeconomic stabilization 
should not, according to this argument, care about stockmarket weakness per se.  And 
monetary policy rules that respond to stock prices seem unlikely to contribute to 
macroeconomic stabilization better than rules that concentrate purely on responding to 
inflation and aggregate economic activity.  Because the relationship between stock prices 
and macroeconomic aggregates tends to be very loose in practice, interest-rate responses 
to stock prices are likely to detract from macroeconomic stabilization.   
 
It also deserves emphasis that the weakness of the stockmarket was largely a symptom of 
the faulty U.K. policy framework in place in the 1970s—i.e., of highly inflationary policy 
accompanied by nonmonetary interventions.  These nonmonetary interventions were 
distortions that worsened for private corporations the costs of high inflation rates.  Direct 
controls on prices, profits, and dividends, alongside an unindexed taxation system, 
magnified the collapse of the stockmarket (as well as other U.K. markets for corporate 
capital, such as the debenture market, which contracted dramatically in the mid-1970s).  
Among their other effects, the nonmonetary measures against inflation meant that prices 
were not allowed to have their optimal relation to costs, intensifying the squeeze on 
corporate liquidity in the mid-1970s.  The U.K. monetary policy easings in 1974−76 may 
have been partly undertaken to lessen this squeeze.  For example, policymakers may have 
been more inclined to boost aggregate demand on the grounds that this would hold down 
nominal unit costs and also restrain unit cost growth relative to inflation.  But that 
rationale for monetary policy easing reflects the flawed U.K. doctrinal framework, with 
its neglect of the links between aggregate demand and inflation.  The decision to continue 
expansionary policy actually perpetuated the inflation problem.  And there are a variety 
of policy tools besides monetary instruments that can address a corporate liquidity 
squeeze. 
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Another rationalization for the policy easings of the 1970s might be found in the fact that 
the price index used to compute the “headline” inflation series in the United Kingdom, 
the Retail Price Index, gives a heavy weight to mortgage costs.  This factor is not relevant 
to the consideration of the 1971 monetary policy easing, because the inclusion of 
mortgages in the RPI began only in the mid-1970s (Lawson, 1992, p. 849).  But, for the 
other easing periods examined above, it could conceivably be argued that an easing was 
justified by the connection between mortgages and price inflation.  Might policymakers 
have thought that cutting policy rates would reduce mortgage rates, thereby helping to 
reduce RPI inflation pressure, and perhaps producing a favorable wage-price spiral via 
links between the RPI and wages?  Again, such rationales might help explain U.K. policy 
decisions in a positive-economics sense, but do not seem to us provide a good economic 
justification for those decisions.  Any thinking by policymakers along “mortgage 
rate/price/wage spiral” lines is valid only in the faulty nonmonetary framework of 
inflation analysis.  Judged from a more orthodox position on inflation determination, the 
“spiral” view is invalid except as a description of the very short run.  Interest-rate cuts 
aimed at provoking mortgage rate cuts might deliver short-term inflation benefits, but do 
so at the cost of long-term inflation control.  Over the long run, RPI behavior is similar to 
that of indices of U.K. prices that exclude mortgage costs, such as the RPIX series and 
the modern CPI.  Fundamentally, this is because, when it comes to longer-term inflation 
determination, the path of aggregate demand tends to swamp other factors.  Interest-rate 
cuts ultimately raise RPI inflation via the stimulus to demand, so the cuts do not have a 
sound foundation as an inflation-control measure. 
 
We therefore find no legitimate basis for the monetary policy followed in the United 
Kingdom during the 1970s in either stockmarket or mortgage rate behavior.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Economic policy in the United Kingdom during the 1970s was guided by a doctrinal 
framework that suggested that inflation arose from nonmonetary factors and could—and 
only could—be brought down by nonmonetary measures.  This contrasts with the modern 
policymaking framework in many countries, which is guided by the notion that monetary 
restraint—and only monetary restraint—is the way to control inflation.  We have argued 
that policymakers’ adherence to the older doctrinal framework is useful for understanding 
why they made the mistakes that led to U.K. inflation outcomes in the 1970s.  Seemingly 
nonstandard interest-rate decisions during the 1970s can be understood as a consequence   40
of policymakers using this framework, even though the decisions are unjustifiable from 
the point of view of more enlightened economic theory.  Moreover, the U.S. Great 
Inflation of the Seventies can be understood as arising from U.S. policymakers’ embrace 
of the U.K. nonmonetary framework.  After pursuing an orthodox policy against inflation 
during 1969—which would have avoided the 1970s Great Inflation if it had been 
continued—U.S. policy circles in the early 1970s inherited the faulty doctrine already in 
place in the United Kingdom.  The similarities of the U.S. and U.K. Great Inflation 
experiences can therefore be seen as arising not from common shocks, but from common 
errors in policymaking doctrine.  41
Appendix A.  U.S. policy against inflation during the 1960s 
 
Wage-price guideposts—i.e., federal government announcements giving 
recommendations for the maximum increases to take place in private sector wages and 
prices, sometimes laid out on an industry-by-industry basis—were used as an anti-
inflation measure by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations during the 1960s.  In this 
Appendix, we show that the thinking underlying these measures was not the same as that 
underlying the 1971−74 U.S. wage and price controls and other 1970s nonmonetary 
measures against inflation.  We thereby reaffirm our position that 1970s U.S. policy on 
inflation arose from the adoption by 1970s U.S. policymakers of U.K. cost-push views, 
rather than from a continuation of the doctrines adhered to by 1960s U.S. policymakers.
36 
 
We summarize the issues involved ahead of our detailed discussion.  The major, and most 
authoritative, 1960s proponents of guidelines explicitly rejected the nonmonetary (a.k.a. 
pure cost-push) view of inflation.  As we detail below, the 1961−68 policymaking view 
was not as orthodox or modern as that prevailing in 1969−70, but it did share with the 
1969−70 and modern positions the view that inflation was sensitive to both positive and 
negative output gaps.  It follows that policymakers accepted that aggregate demand 
measures by themselves could produce price stability: i.e., they conceded that monetary 
policy measures that resolutely restricted the level of aggregate demand would, if applied, 
be sufficient to remove all inflationary pressure.  Policymakers opposed such an 
application, however, and instead favored a mix of aggregate demand and guideline 
policies. Guidelines had value, according to this view, as a complement to aggregate 
demand measures, and specifically could improve the inflation rate achievable under full 
employment; but if price stability was desired and guidelines were unavailable, it was 
accepted that aggregate demand measures were capable of securing price stability.   
 
The 1970s U.S. doctrine departed from both the 1960s U.S. official position and modern 
views by embracing the “British” position that inflation was insensitive to negative 
output gaps.  Monetary policy measures by themselves could not remove all inflationary 
pressure according to the 1970s view; which is to say, it was believed that even with 
demand restricted to a low level, prolonged inflation could occur.  Pure cost-push 
——————————————————————————————————— 
36 As a related matter, we aim to show that our reference to the “Great Inflation of the Seventies” as a 
distinct entity is not a denial that the United States had an inflation problem during the 1960s; therefore, it 
is not subject to the criticism of Levin and Taylor (2008).   42
inflation consequently could occur according to the 1970s doctrinal framework, so 
inflation was viewed as a nonmonetary phenomenon. 
 
A1. Samuelson and Solow 
 
Prior to considering policymakers’ views, we first consider the rationale for the U.S. 
guideposts of the 1960s offered by Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow.  Though neither 
was officially affiliated with the Johnson Administration, they were affiliated with the 
1960−61 Kennedy transition and 1961−63 Kennedy Administration, and were the most 
prominent scholarly defenders of the guidepost policies. 
 
As is well known, Samuelson and Solow (1960) are associated with a simple Phillips 
curve of the type: 
 
πt = a0 + a1E(ut − ut*). 
 
or the same specification with an expectational term: 
 
πt = a0 + a1E(ut − ut*) + a2Etπt+1, 
 
with a1 < 0, ut* being the natural unemployment rate.  We include a rational expectation 
of inflation in specifying the dynamic Phillips curve above.  It is true that an element of 
1960s and 1970s controversies on inflation determination was how expectations were 
formed—for example, whether the expected-inflation variable should consist of lagged 
inflation with unit coefficient, lagged inflation with nonunit coefficient, or a rational 
expectation of current or future inflation.  But this controversy is not germane to the issue 
of a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, which can emerge even with a 
rational expectation of inflation provided that the expectation has a coefficient a2 
differing from unity (specifically, 0 < a2 < 1). 
 
The dynamic equation has a long-run form: 
 
E[π] = b0 + b1E[(u − u*)] 
with b0 = a0/(1−a2), b1 = a1/(1−a2). 
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Some observers have interpreted the position that policymakers tried to exploit a 
perceived inflation/unemployment tradeoff as implying policymaker belief in this long-
run condition coupled with a target for unemployment below the full-employment or 
natural rate; that is, an objective for unemployment of E[(u − u*)] < 0.  But this does not 
appear to be what 1960s advocates of a long-run Phillips curve relation had in mind in 
speaking of a tradeoff; rather, the employment target was characterized as a full-
employment concept, with the associated unemployment rate being a distinct value 
pinned down by real factors; see, for example, Samuelson (1970a, p. 42).  Furthermore, at 
the policy level, Federal Reserve Chairman Martin articulated in 1967 the desirability of 
avoiding “a situation of overfull employment and overutilization of resources” (February 
9, 1967, testimony, in Joint Economic Committee, 1967, p. 416). 
 
If the policymaker goal for real variables amounted to a zero output (and unemployment) 
gap, how does the Samuelson-Solow relation imply a long-run policymaking dilemma?  
Let us add a shock term to the dynamic Phillips curve, 
 
πt = a0 + a1E(ut − ut*) + a2Etπt+1 + ξt. 
 
Samuelson and Solow (1960) stressed the importance of variations in ξt and, as did later 
authors, they labeled it a “cost-push” factor.  Provided it has a zero mean, however, this 
shock term does not generate a long-run tradeoff between inflation and real variables.  
The shock term produces a tradeoff in variances, not in means, and continues to do so if a 
long-run vertical Phillips curve replaces the one studied by Samuelson and Solow (1960).  
(See Taylor, 1979, 1986.) 
 
If, on the other hand, the cost-push shock term does have a nonzero mean, then we can 
decompose the long-run intercept of the Phillips curve as b0 = π* + E[ξ], where π* is the 
inflation rate corresponding to price stability and E[ξ] is the mean of the ξt series.  Then 
  
E[π] = π* + E[ξ] + b1E[(u − u*)]. 
 
It is the long-run nonvertical, nonzero-mean shock term that delivers the tradeoff or 
policy dilemma that Samuelson and Solow (1960) emphasized.  Samuelson and Solow 
argued that inflationary momentum arising from cost-push sources meant that E[ξ] could 
not be counted on to be zero.  Samuelson (1969) stated: “In 1960, when I prepared for 
President[-Elect] Kennedy a report on the State of the American Economy, I had to   44
express pessimism concerning the ability of any mixed economy to achieve price stability 
along with full employment and free markets.”  (Emphasis in original.) 
 
Similarly, Samuelson (1961) commented, “there is reason to fear that the cost-push spiral 
of creeping inflation may come back into being in 1962 while unemployment is still at 
the socially undesirable level of more than 5 percent.”  In 1970, he asked, “What can be 
done about cost-push inflation, this scourge that makes it impossible to have both full 
employment and price stability?” (Samuelson, 1970b.) 
  
The guidepost policy came into force in the United States in 1962.  Subsequently, 
Samuelson (1968, p. 60) argued that while a (permanently nonvertical) Phillips curve 
relation continued to be a structural feature underlying U.S. data, guideposts could 
produce deviations from the historical curve by decreasing the mean of cost-push shocks: 
 
  “All these studies pick up what we all thought was there, namely, a strong cost-
push element in the 1955−57 data… There is a plus residual continuing for many 
quarters in that earlier period and there is a negative residual in the 1960s.” 
 
Reflecting this view, Solow (1968, p. 13) added an intercept-dummy variable when 
including post-1962 observations in his estimated Phillips curve equation, so as to 
capture the favorable effects on mean inflation claimed for the guidepost policies. 
 
Samuelson and Solow repeatedly reaffirmed in the 1960s that they did not envision 
inflation as a pure cost-push phenomenon a la the U.K. (and later also, Burns’) 
conception.  It was a time-varying intercept—equivalently, a Phillips curve shock term of 
nonzero mean—which was the source of a tradeoff or policy dilemma, if aggregate 
demand policies alone were used to control inflation.  The presence of this term was not 
seen as precluding a symmetric Phillips curve relation, whereby inflation depended 
continuously on unemployment or output gaps. 
 
This position—that the tendency for the intercept of the Phillips curve to take undesirably 
high values, makes it appropriate to take guidepost measures against wages and prices—
must be distinguished fundamentally from the pure cost-push position—which is that no 
Phillips relation holds below full employment, leaving incomes policy the only feasible 
instrument against inflation.  Solow made it explicit that his support for guidelines did 
not rest on a pure cost-push view of inflation:   45
  “I want to make this very clear.  I am not resting my case on a theory of cost-push 
inflation… [but instead] only on the degree of tightness in the economy at which 
the price level begins to rise unacceptably rapidly.” (Solow, 1966, p. 64; emphasis 
in original.)   
 
Thus Solow wanted to reduce the mean value of cost-push forces so that the permanently 
nonvertical Phillips curve, though implying an inverse relation between inflation and 
gaps, did not imply a tradeoff between these series.  Solow’s was not a modern view of 
inflation, due to his acceptance of a permanent inflation/unemployment tradeoff and his 
fear of a nonzero mean cost-push shock; but equally, it was not a 1970s-type view of 
inflation, because Solow accepted that inflation did respond continuously to monetary 
policy via an output gap channel. 
 
A2. Policy-level doctrine 
 
Federal Reserve.  It is unclear whether Federal Reserve Chairman Martin believed in a 
long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment.  But he recognized the need to 
avoid overfull employment, as noted above; so, even if he had a nonvertical Phillips 
curve in mind, his aims did not include exploiting it to purchase output levels in excess of 
potential output. 
 
As far as cost-push views are concerned, Chairman Martin in the mid-1960s was not a 
believer in pure cost-push theories of inflation, but he did see cost-push elements as a 
component of inflation (see his February 9, 1967, testimony, in Joint Economic 
Committee, 1967, p. 421).  Aggregate demand measures were not “necessarily the right 
tool” in the face of cost-push inflation, but were essential in the absence of other tools 
being applied (ibid, p. 422); and restraint of aggregate demand could limit the extent to 
which inflation responded to cost-push forces (ibid, p. 425). 
 
Administration personnel.  In 1966, Treasury Secretary Fowler conceded that pursuit of 
price stability via aggregate demand measures alone was feasible: 
 
 “The  administration  included price stability as a goal to be sought along with… 
full employment and a healthy rate of growth.  It believes that there is a 
fundamental compatibility of these three objectives and that in seeking one of 
them it is unwise to sacrifice the others.  If one objective, such as price stability or   46
full employment, is sought with the utmost vigor without concern for the others, 
that is not wise national policy.” (February 3, 1966, testimony, in Joint Economic 
Committee, 1966, p. 180.) 
 
As the above quotation indicates, and in contrast to the case in the 1970s, the use of 
incomes policy as an anti-inflation instrument was seen by 1960s policymakers as 
desirable so as to avoid the need for trading off goals; it did not constitute a denial that, in 
principle, aggregate demand measures alone could deliver price stability.  In keeping with 
this perception, CEA Chairman Gardner Ackley saw guideposts as moving pricing 
decisions in a direction which removed the need to trade off unemployment and inflation: 
 
  “We begin with the fundamental premise that this Nation must be able to enjoy the 
benefits of both high employment and price stability.  We conclude that the wage-
price guideposts offer the best opportunities for encouraging behavior which will 
reconcile these two key objectives.” (February 19, 1965, testimony in Joint 
Economic Committee, 1965, p. 6.) 
 
This statement, like those of Martin, Samuelson, and Solow, reflects a view of inflation 
crucially different from pure cost-push view common to United Kingdom in the 1960s 
and 1970s and to the United States in the 1970s.  Despite his appeal to the presence of 
cost-push elements in the pricing process, Ackley’s statements imply that the effect of 
cost-push elements on inflation can be counteracted by a maintained negative output gap.  
Cost-push elements existed according to 1960s U.S. policy doctrine, and were a source of 
a tradeoff (or, as Ackley put it, “of an inflationary bias of the economy at full 
employment”);
37 but 1960s U.S. doctrine did not deny that, in principle, a desired 
inflation rate could be secured solely by the fixing of aggregate demand at a certain level. 
 
A3. U.S. policy in 1969−70 
 
As discussed in the main text, 1969 saw two important changes in official U.S. doctrine.  
First, there was an explicit embrace of no-long-run tradeoff view, as documented in the 
text from CEA statements.
38 Secondly, the Administration (which initially included 
Arthur Burns as a White House advisor, ahead of his move to the Federal Reserve in 
——————————————————————————————————— 
37 Ackley (1966, p. 78).  See Ackley (1978, p. 444) for a related discussion, which likewise concludes that a 
cost-push disturbance in the traditional Phillips curve is the source of the policy dilemma. 
38 Romer (2007, pp. 10−11) similarly notes that late 1960s U.S. policymakers rejected any long-run 
tradeoff.   47
1970) took a truly monetary view of inflation by arguing that incomes policy was not 
necessary to eliminate inflation or to remove a long-run tradeoff.  The previous 
Administration’s position that there was an inherent tendency for cost-push forces to have 
a zero average effect on inflation, even in the absence of monetary accommodation, was 
not continued. 
 
This new doctrine had a very short-lived initial influence on policy due to changes in 
views by Chairman Burns during 1970 and by the Nixon Administration thereafter; but it 
was distinct, as we have stressed, from both pre-1969 and 1971−79 policymaker views.   48
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